The Skeptics

 

Skepticism:

How to Behave Without a Criterion of Truth

Today we refer to Skeptics as those whose basic mood is that of doubt. But the old Greek word, skeptikoi, from which skeptics is derived, meant something rather different, namely, seekers or inquirers. To be sure, the Skeptics were doubters, too. They doubted that Plato and Aristotle had succeeded in discovering the truth about the world, and they had these same doubts about the Epicureans and Stoics. But for all their doubt, they were nevertheless seekers after a method for achieving a tranquil life. There founder was Pyrrho (361-270 B.C.E.), and early Skepticism was known also as Pyrrhonism. They were also known as Academics, after Arcesilaus (316-241B.C.E.), who became head of Plato’s Academy in the third century, rejected Plato’s metaphysics, and developed the doctrine of probabilism. Among the many other notable Skeptics the names Carneades (214-129 B.C.E.) and Sextus Empiricus (ca. 200 C.E.) are outstanding. As Skepticism moved through its different periods of development, it took on many variations in its point of view. While many of the original documents written by the Skeptics are now lost, some of the works of the authoritative codifier of Greek Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus, have survived. In the early sections of his Pyrrhonic Sketches, Sextus offers an illuminating account of the meaning and purposes of the viewpoint of Skepticism.

What gave rise to Skepticism? Sextus says that Skepticism originated in the hope of attaining mental peace or calmness. People have been disturbed he says, by the contradiction in things and plagued by doubt as to which alternative they should believe. Accordingly the Skeptics thought that if they could by investigation determine truth from falsehood they could then attain tranquility of mind. The Skeptics were stuck, however, by the different conceptions of truth difference philosophers had proposed. They also noticed that people who searched for truth could be placed into three groups, those who think they have discovered the truth (and these the Skeptics called "dogmatists"), those who confess they have not found it and also assert that it cannot be found (and this they also considered a dogmatic position), and finally those who persevere in the search for it. Unlike the first two, says Sextus, "the Skeptics keep on searching." Skepticism is not a denial of the possibility of finding truth, nor is it a denial of the basic facts of human experience. It is rather a continuous process of inquiry in which every explanation of experience is tested by a counter example. The fundamental principle of Skepticism, says Sextus, is that to every proposition an equal proposition is opposed. It is in consequence of this principle, he says, that "we end by ceasing to dogmatize."

The Skeptics were greatly impressed by the fact that "appearances" call forth such a variety of explanations from those who experience them. They discovered also, says Sextus, that arguments opposed to each other seem to have equal force. By equality of force he meant equality in respect of the credibility of probability of alternative explanations. Accordingly, the Skeptics were lead to suspend judgment and to refrain from denying or affirming anything. From this suspension of judgment they hoped to achieve an undisturbed and calm mental state.

Clearly, the Skeptics did not give up the enterprise of vigorous thought and debate. Nor did they deny the evident facts about life, that people become thirsty and hungry and that they are in peril when they come near a precipice. That people must be careful about their behavior was very clear to the Skeptics. They had no doubt that they lived in a "real" world. They only wondered whether this world had been accurately described. No one, according to Sextus, will dispute that objects have this or that appearance; the question is whether "the object is in reality such as it appears to be." Therefore, even though the Skeptics refused to live dogmatically, they did not deny the evident facts about experience. "We paid due regard to appearances," says Sextus. Daily life seemed to the Skeptics to require careful recognition of four items, which Sextus calls 1) the guidance of nature, 2) the constraint of the feelings, 3) the tradition of laws and customs, and 4) the instruction of the arts. Each of these contributes to a successful and peaceful living and not one of them requires dogmatic interpretation or evaluation, only acceptance. Thus, it is by Nature's guidance that we are naturally capable of sensation and thought. Also, it is by the force of the feelings that hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink. And it is the tradition of laws and customs that constrains us in everyday life to accept piety as good and impiety as evil. Finally, says Sextus, it is by virtue of the instructions of the arts that we engage in those arts in which we choose to participate.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Skeptics were far from denying the evident facts of sense perception. Indeed, Sextus says that those who say that the Skeptics deny appearances "seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School." They did not question appearances but only "the account given of appearances." As an example, Sextus says that honey appears to be sweet, and "this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses..." But the real question is whether it is really, in essence, sweet. Thus, the arguments of the Skeptics about appearances are expounded not with the intention of denying the reality of appearance but in order to point out the "rashness" of the "Dogmatists." The moral Sextus drew from this treatment of the objects of sense was that if human reason can be so easily deceived by appearances, "if reason is such a trickster as to all by snatch the appearances from under our very eyes," should we not be particularly wary of following reason in the case of non-evident matters and thus avoid rashness?

Non-evident matters had a central place in the great philosophical systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Here the Skeptics found elaborate theories about the nature of physical things. But how can any theory of physics, an inquiry which deals with non-evident matters, give us reliable truth? The Skeptics had a double attitude toward the study of physics. On the one hand, they refused to theorize about physics as if to give "firm and confident opinions on any of the things in physical theory about which firm doctrines are held." Nevertheless, they did touch on physics, "in order to have for every argument an equal argument to oppose it, and for the sake of mental tranquility." Their approaches to matters of ethics and logic were similar. In each case, their pursuit of mental tranquility was not a negative approach, a refusal to think, but rather an active approach. Their mode of "the suspension of judgment" involved the activity of "setting things in opposition." As Sextus says, "we oppose appearances to appearances, or thoughts to thoughts, or appearances to thoughts."

The Skeptics, then, distinguished between two types of inquiry, between those dealing with evident and non-evident matters. Evident matters, such as whether it is night or day, raise no serious problems of knowledge. In this category, too, are evident requirements for social and personal tranquility, for we know that customs and laws bind society together. But non-evident matters, as, for example, whether the stuff of nature is made of atoms or some fiery substance, do raise intellectual controversies. Whenever we go beyond the sphere of what is evident in human experience, our quest for knowledge should proceed under the influence of creative doubt. Thus, if we ask how we know what the universe is like, the Skeptics would answer that we do not know. It may be, they said, that people can attain the truth; it may also be that they are in error. But whether they have the truth or are in error cannot be decided, because there is available as yet no reliable criterion for determining the truth in non-evident matters.

The Senses are Deceptive

If, as the Stoics had argued, our knowledge comes to us from our experience or sense impressions, all the more reason is there to doubt the adequacy of all knowledge. For the fact is that our senses give us different information about the same object at different times and under different circumstances. From a distance, a square building looks round. Landscape looks different at different times of day. To some people honey is bitter. Painted scenery at a theatre gives the impression of real doors and windows when only lines exist on a flat surface. That we do have impressions it is certain, as, for example, when we "see" a bent oar in the water. But what we can never be certain about is whether in fact the oar is bent. Although the oar can be taken out of the water and the error of perception discovered, not every perception affords such an easy test for its accuracy and truth. Most of our knowledge is based upon perceptions for which we have no criterion for truth. The conclusion of the Skeptic, therefore, is that we cannot be certain that our knowledge of the nature of things is true or not true.

Moral Rules raise Doubts

Moral conceptions as well as physical objects are subject to doubt. People in different communities have different ideas of what is good and right. Customs and laws differ with each community and in the same community at different times. The Stoics said that there is a universal reason in which all people share, leading to a general consensus of all people regarding human rights. The Skeptics challenged both the theory and the fact saying that there was no proof that all people have the capacity to agree upon the truth of universal moral principles and adding that there is no evidence that people in fact exhibit this universal agreement. The fact is that people disagree. Moreover, those who disagree can all make equally strong cases for their own points of view. On matters of morality there is no absolute knowledge; there is only opinion. Whereas the Stoics had argued that on certain matters the test for the truth was the "irresistible perception," the Skeptics responded by saying that the sad fact is that however strongly an opinion is held, it is, after all, still only an opinion, and one can with as much evidence support an opposite opinion. When people take a dogmatic stand, their conclusions always seem to them to be irresistible, but this is no guaranty that their conceptions are true.

The outcome of the Skeptical attitude toward our knowledge of the nature of things and our knowledge of moral truth is that we have a right to doubt the validity of knowledge. Since we lack sure knowledge, it behooves us to withhold judgment on all matters. But there is matter about which it is difficult for people to withhold judgment, and that is the matter of ethics. When one faces a problem of behavior, one wants to know what is the right thing to do, and this requires knowledge of the right. It would appear, therefore, that the Skeptics had made ethics impossible and had removed from men any guide for human behavior.

Morality Possible without Intellectual Certainty

The Skeptics argued, however, that it was not necessary to have knowledge in order to behave sensibly. It is enough, they said, to have reasonable assurance, or what they called "probability." There could never be absolute certainty, but if there was a strong probability that our ideas would lead us to a life of happiness and peacefulness, we should be justified in following these ideas. We are able from daily experience to distinguish between notions that are not clear and those that have a high degree of clarity. When notions of right have a high degree of clarity, they create in us a strong belief that they are right, and this is all we need to lead us to action. For this reason customs, the laws of the land, and our basic appetites are for the most part reliable guides. But even here the Skeptic wants to retain a certain amount of caution, so that we will not mistake appearance for reality and above all avoid fanaticism and dogmatism. Although we are able to act enthusiastically even without a criterion of truth, our psychological safety requires that we leave open the channels of inquiry. The only safe attitude to take is one of doubt about the absolute truth of any idea. And one who can maintain a sense of imperturbability under this mood of doubt has the best chance of achieving the happy life.

If we ask whether the Skeptics had a "system," Sextus answers "No," if by system is meant "an adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances" and where "dogma" is taken to mean "assent to a non-evident proposition." But if by system is meant "a procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning... indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly...," then the Skeptic did have a system. For, as Sextus says, "we follow a line of reasoning which...points us to a life comfortable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and our own instinctive feelings."