(1724–1804 CE)
handout k
Section A
formal vs. material sciences
(logic) (physics and ethics)
{nature} {freedom}
rational empirical
(a priori) (a posteriori)
The empirical part of ethics = “practical anthropology”.
The rational part of ethics = “metaphysics of morals”.
The “supreme principle” (the ‘groundwork’) of the metaphysics of morals = The Categorical Imperative.
analytical presentation vs. synthetic presentation
(Chapters 1 and 2, our (Chapter 3 and CRITIQUE OF
concern in this class) PRACTICAL REASON)
‘Analysis’ of “common rational knowledge of morality” into its philosophical principles, i.e., its basic “synthetic a priori truths” and their justification by reasoning. [Ch. 1] Defense of the “supreme principle of morality” (The Categorical Imperative) from objections of undisciplined philosophizing. [Ch. 2]
Section B
The only “absolutely unqualified good” is “a good will”. “A good will” is good in itself and cannot bring about what is evil. Other allegedly supreme goods can be turned to a bad end and/or are desirable only for what they bring about: for example,
1. “Talents of the mind” = intelligence, wit, and judgment
2. “Qualities of temperament” = courage, resolution, and perseverance
3. “Gifts of fortune” = wealth, health, and power
4. “Happiness” = the general well-being and contentment with one’s condition
5. (Not to be “happy”, but to be “worthy of happiness” should be the aim
of a free, rational, self-governing, moral being.)
6. “Instruments of a Good Will” – moderation, self-control, and deliberation
(Intentions, not consequences, determine moral worth.
But an act of will is not equivalent to a mere wish.)
Section C
Kant’s “synthetic a priori” principles of duty:
1. “To have moral worth an action must be done from duty.”
2. “An action done from duty derives its moral worth, NOT FROM THE PURPOSE which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the PRINCIPLE OF VOLITION by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.”
3. “Duty is the necessity of acting from RESPECT [reverence] for the law.”
4. “The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than THE CONCEPTION OF LAW in itself, WHICH CERTAINLY IS ONLY POSSIBLE IN A RATIONAL BEING, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.”
5. “I am never to act otherwise than SO THAT I COULD ALSO WILL THAT MY MAXIM SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW.”
Because of the conflict in our ‘human nature’ between DUTY (arising from our rational, noumenal freedom) and our INCLINATIONS (arising from nature and our bodies–phenomenal causality), we experience our own reason in its practical employment as an “imperative”.
[“Respect” is an effect, not the cause, of “acting from duty”, but it can become a powerful “interest” of ours, and it can motivate us to act morally.]
Section D
Division of Imperatives:
1. HYPOTHETICAL 2. CATEGORICAL
“If A is wanted, B is imperative.” “A is imperative.”
a. Problematic commands: c. Apodictic commands:
imperatives of skill, laws of morality;
technical rules; arising maxims acted on FROM DUTY.
from OPTIONAL ENDS.
b. Assertoric commands:
counsels of prudence,
pragmatic imperatives; arising
from the universal desire for HAPPINESS.
Section E
The CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE is Kant’s “supreme principle of morality”
– the ultimate “synthetic a priori truth” at the base of all morality.
There is only ONE Categorical Imperative.
[Otherwise, the will might face a fundamental conflict of duties],
but it takes [at least] SIX different formulations to bring out its full meaning:
1. "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
– the UNIVERSALIZABILITY criterion
2. “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”
– the TELEOLOGICAL perspective
3. “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”
– the principle of “Persons as ends-in-themselves”, or “Respect for persons as ends”
4. “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.”
– the AUTONOMY criterion
5. “So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.”
– the ideal of a “Kingdom of Ends”
6. “All maxims as proceeding from our own making of laws ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends
as a kingdom of nature.”
– the RESPONSIBILITY to transform the “Kingdom of Nature”
The Four Examples
Kant considers a few duties, examining duties both to ourselves and to others,
as well as perfect and imperfect duties.
The division of duties is as follows:
1. Perfect duty to self. Consider a man reduced to despair by a string of misfortunes; he is tired of living but is yet sufficiently reasonable to ask himself whether taking his own life would not be a violation of duty. He asks himself whether the maxim of his action could be a universal law of Nature. His maxim is: "From self-love, I will live by the rule to end my life when longer life seems likely to be miserable rather then satisfactory." Can this maxim of self-love become a universal law of Nature? At once we see that there would be a self-contradiction in a system of Nature that allowed self-love to justify the destruction of life when the purpose of self-love is to motivate us to make life better. Nature cannot exist in such a way. Thus the maxim cannot be made into a law of Nature; and consequently it conflicts with the supreme law of duty.
2. Perfect duty to others. Another man finds himself forced to borrow money. He knows that he will be unable to pay it back, but he also recognizes that no one will lend him money unless he firmly promises to repay it by a certain date. He is tempted to make the promise, but he is still conscientious enough to ask himself whether or not it is unlawful and against duty to avoid his financial troubles in this way. If he decides to make the promise, his maxim would be: "Whenever I find that I need money, I will borrow with a promise to repay even though I know I will not be able to do so." We can allow that such a policy of self-love will be entirely beneficial to his future welfare. The question, however, is whether such an action is right. Let him put this policy into the form of a universal law of Nature and ask: "What will happen if my maxim becomes a universal law?" At once he sees that his maxim could not be a universal law of Nature: it necessarily contradicts itself. For imagine a universal law of Nature that everyone who thinks himself in need would promise anything at all with no intention of keeping such a promise. Both the promise and the goal sought by it would be impossible. Who will believe such a promise? The very attempt would be taken as a ridiculous laughable pretense.
3. Imperfect duty to self. A third man finds that he has a talent which, were it cultivated, would make him a useful person in many ways. But he lives in comfortable surroundings and devotes himself to pleasures without trying to develop and perfect his fortunate natural ability. Yet he asks himself whether his maxim of neglecting his talent, which surely agrees with his yen for pleasures, can also agree with what is called duty. He finds that a system of Nature could very well include a law that every man (like the South Sea Islander) could allow his talents to rust away while he devotes his life simply to idleness, enjoyment, and sex - in short, to a life of pleasure seeking. But this man cannot will that his maxim become a universal law of Nature, ingrained in our own nature as an instinct. As a rational being, he necessarily will that all his abilities be developed; he must employ these abilities, given to him by Nature for any number of potential uses.
4. Imperfect duty to others. A fourth man is prosperous but sees that others must live in dire distress. He could help them, but he thinks: "What is that to me? Let a man be as well off as heaven allows - or as well off as he can make himself. I ask nothing of him and envy him nothing. But I have not the slightest inclination to help him when he is in trouble." Now if this maxim became a universal law of nature, mankind could still exist and perhaps exist in a better condition than where everyone praises benevolence and goodwill, even practicing them at Christmas, but at other times cheats, betrays, and violates the rights of his fellow man. While there could be such a universal law of Nature, yet it is impossible to will that such a law should govern universally as a law of Nature. A will which proposes such a law would contradict itself. Occasions can indeed arise in which a person would desire the love and sympathy of others; but by proposing such a law of Nature, he would have robbed himself of all hope of the help he wants.
These examples of what we may take to be actual duties are clearly derivable from a single principle. The general canon for judging the moral quality of our actions is this: we must be able to will that the maxim of our action be a universal law.
| Last Updated: 10/19/22 |