Epictetus

(60-117 C.E.)

 

Self Discipline

The philosophy of Epictetus, a Roman Stoic, developed from the teachings of Zeno (336-264 B.C.E.), who founded the Stoa Poikile (Painted Porch), the last of the four most famous schools of ancient Athens. Dependence on Greek thought is typical of Roman philosophy; in the long history of the Roman Empire, no indigenous philosophies of merit were produced. Of all the Greek philosophical systems transplanted to Rome, Stoicism was probably the most successful. By the close of the second century B.C.E., the Stoic philosophy was firmly rooted in its new environment, and in the succeeding four centuries, it was accepted by members of both the lower and the upper strata of society. It became extremely popular with the Roman soldiery as a philosophy of manly indifference to hardship, and it also appealed as a "citadel of the soul" to such outstanding intellectuals as Cicero, Seneca, Emperor Markus Aurelius, and Epictetus. The pressing need for the prophylactic powers of the Stoic philosophy was generated by the sordidness and the debauchery of the era, for which one of the Epictetus’ observations serves well as a description: "Men bite and vilify each other, and take possessions of public assemblies, as wild beasts do of solitudes and mountains; and convert courts of justice into dens of robbers. They are intemperate, adulterers, seducers."

There is little information about the personal history of Epictetus. The precise date and location of his birth are unknown, but what evidence exists indicates that he was born in the Greek city of Hierapolis in Phrygia about 50 C.E. It is reported that as a child he was sold into slavery by his parents, and he became part of the household of a profligate Roman soldier. An apt characterization of Epictetus, even as a young man, is given in antidote narrated by Origen: upon one occasion in which his angry master was twisting his leg, Epictetus commented, "You will break my leg," whereupon the master twisted harder and broke the leg. To this Epictetus rejoined with utter calm, "Did I not tell you so?" In keeping with Roman practice, Epictetus was allowed to attend the lectures of a contemporary teacher of Stoic philosophy, because he showed great intellectual ability. When his master died, he granted his freedom. By this time, he had already achieved some fame as a philosopher and chose to remain in Rome as a teacher. When, in 89 C.E., the despotic Emperor Domitian forced all philosophers to leave Rome, Epictetus went to Nicopolis. There he started another school in which he taught until his death. (c. 130 C.E.)

Epictetus was more distinguished as a lecturer than as a writer. Nothing has been preserved of his original writings, but Arrian, one of his disciples, transcribed his lectures on ethics and had them edited in eight volumes. The most important of these works are the Discourses of Epictetus and the Enchiridion,or Manual. Epictetus’ aim was "to excite his hearers to virtue," and when he gave his lectures, we have it from Arrian that "his audience could not help being affected in the very manner he intended they should."

The Stoics identify as moral people those who live in accordance with the dictates of reason, and they portray them as self-sufficient individuals capable of disciplining their desires and of remaining supremely indifferent to life’s vicissitudes. By virtue of their moral principles and their conception of the good life, the Stoics regard themselves as belonging in the Socratic tradition. They maintain, as do their forerunners, the Cynics, that the lesson to be drawn from the life and teachings of Socrates is that human virtue and happiness depend not on material success but on the formation of character that is true to one’s essential nature, one’s rationality. Furthermore, the Stoics contend, that it is through conduct in conformity with their rational nature that people are united with each other and with the universe. The meaning of the Socratic exhortation "Know thyself" is then clear, for it is only through self-knowledge that people can participate in the moral community and fulfill their functions in the grand design of the universe.

The Stoic view of the universe, compounded from among a wide range of Greek theories by the founder of the Stoa, Zeno, and his brilliant successors, Cleanthes (c. 310-230 B.C.E.) and Chrysippus (280-209 B.C.E.) lends support to the Stoic ethic. Drawing chiefly from the doctrines of the early physical philosopher Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.E.), they depict the universe as an organic unity in which the form and purpose of each part is determined by God, who is thought of as a rational principle immanent in the whole. The Stoics understand God as both the vital force that creates all things in this internally connected universe and as the cosmic intelligence that governs it from within. This conception of God - called pantheism -serves as a basis for the ethical insights of the Stoics, because an individual, as a rational being, is a "fragment torn from God." All people possess the ability to comprehend the divine nature, and the good life consists in living in conformity with it. For, as Epictetus says, "Where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What is the essence of God . . . Right Reason? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of good."

Epictetus is more interested than other Roman Stoics in metaphysics and remains more loyal than they to the original position of the Stoa. Nevertheless, his attitude toward speculation about the nature of things is more pious than probing, more religious than philosophical, more practical than theoretical. For, Epictetus, the indisputable facts to which philosophers should direct their attention are humanity’s inherent value, its kinship to God, and its duty to be worthy of God, as well as the hindrances that people encounter in their attempts to live nobly. The conditions and limitations of the moral life are already given in human nature:

But what says Zeus? "Epictetus, if it were possible I would have made your body and your possessions (those trifles that you prize) free and untrammeled. But as things are - never forget this - this body is not your, it is but a clever mixture of clay. But since I could not make it free, I gave you a portion of our divinity, this faculty of impulse to act and not to act, of will to get and will to avoid.

The mission of the sage is to urge people to examine themselves and to discipline their will to conform to reason.

According to Epictetus, the person who values virtue for its own sake is happy. Virtue, he tells us, is a condition of the will wherein it is governed by reason, with the result that the virtuous person seeks only those things that are within reach and avoids those that things that are beyond it. Unhappiness is the inevitable lot of those who desire what they cannot obtain. Wise individuals, then, resign themselves to limiting desires to matters within their control. With respect to desires that cannot be satisfied, they are literally apathetic, that is, they have no feelings about them. In addition, they know that whatever is beyond an individual’s control is irrelevant to ethics. Virtuous persons find within themselves all that is necessary to achieve happiness—morally, they are entirely self-sufficient.

In answering the question: "What is within our power?’ Epictetus reaffirms one of the distinctive doctrines of Stoicism: It is our attitudes toward events, not events themselves, that we can control. Nothing is by its own nature calamitous - even death is terrible only if we fear it. Again, although one may fail to carry out the actions prescribed by divine providence - that is, in the execution of one’s duties, circumstances may prevent a successful outcome - one should remain unconcerned. For example, if because of poverty parents are unable to feed their children, they should not be disturbed as long as they sincerely made the effort to provide for them. If they will to do their duty, they are fulfilling their obligation, for only this much lies within their power. Moreover, they may be sure that all that happens comes about by divine necessity and that whatever God does is for the best.

Epictetus, as a moral advisor, counsels us to cultivate an attitude of indifference to good and bad fortune alike, because external events are beyond our control. Therefore prudent individuals do not allow themselves to be enslaves by the demands of their bodies or to become emotionally attached to persons or objects. But we are warned that happiness requires unremitting self-discipline:

Practice yourself, for heaven’s sake, in little things; and thence proceed to greater "I have a pain in my head." Do not lament. "I have a pain in my ear." Do not lament. I do not say you may never groan; but do not groan in spirit; or, if your servant be a long while in bringing you something to bind your head, do not croak and go into hysterics, and say, "Everybody hates me." For, who would not hate such a one? . . . Relying for the future on these principles, walk erect and free.