Aristotle

  (384-322 B.C.E.)

 

Aristotle‘s theory of morality centers around his belief that people, as everything else in nature, have a distinctive "end" to achieve or a function to fulfill. For this reason, his theory is rightly called teleological. He begins his Nicomachean Ethics by saying that "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good …" If this is so, the question for ethics is, "What is the good at which human behavior aims?’ Plato answered this question by saying that people aim at a knowledge of the Idea of the Good. For him this supreme principle of Good was separated from the world of experience and from individuals and was to be arrived at by the mind’s ascent from the visible world to the intelligible world. For Aristotle, on the other hand, the principle of good and right was imbedded within each person; moreover, this principle could be discovered by studying the essential nature of humanity and could be attained through actual behavior in daily life. Aristotle warns his readers, however, not to expect more precision in a discussion of ethics than "the subject-matter will admit." Still, just because this subject is susceptible of "variation and error" does not mean, said Aristotle, that ideas of right and wrong "exist conventionally only, and not in the nature of things." With this in mind, Aristotle set out to discover the basis of morality in the structure of human nature 

Types of "Ends"

Aristotle sets the framework for his ethical theory with a preliminary illustration. Having said that all action aims toward an end, he now wants to distinguish between two major kinds of ends, which can be called instrumental ends (acts that are done as a means for other ends) and intrinsic ends (acts that are done for their own sake). These two types of ends are illustrated, for example, in "every action connected with war." When we consider step by step what is involved in the total activity of a war, we find, says Aristotle, that there is a series of special kinds of acts, which have their won ends but which, when they are completed, are only means by which still other ends are to be achieved. There is, for one thing, the art of the bridle marker. When the bridle is completed, its maker has achieved his end as a riddle maker. But the bridle is a means for the horseman to guide his horse in battle. Also, a carpenter builds a barrack, and when it is completed, he has fulfilled his function as a carpenter. The barracks also fulfill their function when they provide safe shelter for the soldiers. But the ends here achieved by the carpenter and the building are not ends in themselves but are instrumental in housing soldiers until they move on to their next stage of action. Similarly, the function of the builder of ships is fulfilled when the ship is successfully launched, but again this end is in turn a means for transporting the soldiers to the battle. The doctor fulfills his function to the extent that he keeps the soldiers in good health. But the "end" of health in this case becomes a "means" to effective fighting. The officer aims at victory in battle, but victory is the means to peace. Peace itself, though sometimes taken mistakenly as the final end of war, is the means for creating the conditions under which humans, as humans, can fulfill their functions as humans. When we discover what humans aim at, not as carpenter, doctor, or generals, but as humans, we will then arrive at action for its own sake, and for which all other activity is only a means, and this, says Aristotle, must be the Good of Man."

How shall the word "good" be understood? As Plato before him , Aristotle tied the word "good" to the special function of a thing. A hammer is good if it does what hammers are expected to do. A carpenter is good if he or she fulfills his or her function as a builder. This would be true of all crafts and professions. But here Aristotle distinguishes between one’s craft or profession and one’s activity as a person. To be a good doctor, for example, did not mean the same thing as being a good person. One could be a good doctor without being a good person, and vice versa. There are two different functions here, the function of doctoring and the function of acting as a person. To discover the good at which a person should aim, Aristotle said we must discover the distinctive function of human nature. The good person, according to Aristotle, is the person who is fulfilling his or her function as a person.

The Function of Man 

Aristotle asks, "Are we then to suppose that while carpenters and cobbler have a certain works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature without a work?’ Or, if "the eye, hand, foot and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?" Surely, humanity too has a distinctive mode of activity, but what is it? Hear Aristotle analyzes humanity’s nature in order to discover its unique activity, saying, first of all, that humanity’s end "is not mere life," because that plainly is shared even by vegetables, and says Aristotle, "we want what is peculiar to [humanity]," Next there is the life of sensation, "but this again manifestly is common to horses, oxen and every animal." There remains then "an active life of the element that has a rational principle … if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle … then the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue."

Since a human’s function as a human means the proper functioning of the soul, Aristotle sought to describe the nature of the soul. The soul is the form of the body. As such the soul refers to the total person. Accordingly, Aristotle said that the soul has two parts, the irrational and the rational. The irrational part in turn is composed of two subparts, the vegetative and the desiring or "appetitive" parts. For the most part, these are "something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it." The conflict between the rational and irrational elements in man is what raises the problems and subject matter of morality.

Morality involves action, for nothing is called good unless it is functioning. Thus Aristotle says that "as at the Olympic Games it is not the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter the list, for out of these the prize-men are selected; so too in life, of the honorable and good, it is they who act who rightly win the prizes." The particular kind of action implied here, if one has in mind Aristotle’s analysis of the soul, is the rational control and guidance of the irrational parts of the soul. Moreover, the one whose whole life is good, "for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy."

Happiness as the End

Human action should aim at its proper end. Everywhere people aim at pleasure, wealth, and honor. But none of these ends, though they have value, can occupy the place of the chief good for which people should aim. To be an ultimate end an act must be self-sufficient and final, "that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else," and it must be attainable by people. Aristotle seems certain that all people will agree that happiness is the end that alone meets all the requirements for the ultimate end of human action. Indeed, we choose pleasure, wealth, and honor only because we think that "through their instrumentality we will be happy." Happiness, it turn out, is another word or name for good, for like good, happiness is the fulfillment of our distinctive function; or as Aristotle says, "Happiness… is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or virtue."

How does the soul work to attain happiness? The general rule of morality is "to act in accordance with Right Reason." What this means is that the rational part of the soul should control the irrational part. That the irrational part of the soul requires guidance is obvious when we consider what it consists of and what its mechanism is. Referring now only to the appetites, or the "appetitive" part of the soul, we discover first that it is affected or influenced by things outside of the self, such as objects and persons. Also, there are two basic ways in which the appetitive part of the soul reacts to these external factors, these ways being love or hate, or through the concupiscent and irascible "passions." The concupiscent passion leads one to desire things and persons, whereas the irascible passion leads one to avoid or destroy them. It becomes quickly apparent that these passions or capacities for love or hate, attraction or repulsion, creation or destruction, taken by themselves could easily "go wild." In themselves they do not contain any principle of measure or selection. What should a person desire? How much? Under what circumstances? How should one relate oneself to things, wealth, honor, and other people?

We do not automatically act the right way in these matters; as, Aristotle says, "none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exist by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature." Morality has to do with developing habits, the habits of right thinking, right choice, and right behavior.

Virtue as the "Golden Mean"

Since the passions are capable of a wide range of action, all the way from too little to too much, a person must discover the proper meaning of excess and defect and thereby discover the appropriate mean. Virtue is concerned with our various feelings and actions, for it is in them that there can be excess and defect. For example, it is possible, says Aristotle, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion, pleasure and pain, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly. To feel them when we ought to, on which occasions, toward whom, and as we should is the mean; that is the best state for people to be in, and this is virtue. Vice, again, is either extreme, excess or defect, and virtue is the mean. It is through the rational power of the soul that the passions are controlled and action is guided. The virtue of "courage", for example, is the mean between two vices: namely, cowardice (defect) and foolhardiness (excess). Virtue, then, is a state of being, "a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine." Therefore, virtue is a habit of choosing in accordance with a mean.

The mean is not the same for every person, nor is there a mean for every act. Each mean is relative to each person because as the circumstances will vary. In the case of eating, the mean will obviously be different for an adult athlete and a little girl. But for each person, their is nevertheless a proportionate or relative mean, temperance, clearly indicating what extremes - namely, gluttony (excess) and starvation (defect) - would constitute vice for that person. Similarly, when one gives money, liberality, as the mean between prodigality and stinginess, is not an absolute figure but is relative to one’s assets. Moreover, for some acts there is no mean at all; their very nature already implies badness, such as spite, envy, adultery, theft, and murder. These are bad in themselves and not in their excesses or deficiencies. One is always wrong in doing them.

Deliberation and Choice

There are in the rational soul two kinds of reasoning. The first is theoretical, giving us knowledge of fixed principles or philosophical wisdom. The other is practical, giving us a rational guide to our action under the particular circumstances in which we find ourselves, and this is practical wisdom. What is important about the role of reason is that without this rational element, we would not have any moral capacity. Again, Aristotle stressed that although we have a natural capacity for right behavior, we do not act rightly by nature. Our life consists of an indeterminate number of possibilities. Goodness is in us potentially; but unlike the acorn out of which the oak will grow with almost mechanical certitude, we must move from what is potential I us to its actuality by knowing what we must do, deliberating about it, and then choosing in fact to do it. Unlike Plato and Socrates, who thought that to know the good was sufficient to do the good, Aristotle saw that there must be deliberate choice in addition to knowledge. Thus, Aristotle said that "the origin of moral action - its efficient, not its final cause - is choice, and (the origin) of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end." There cannot be choice without reason. And again, "intellect itself … moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical."

Responsibility

Morality and moral choice imply human responsibility. If some ways of behaving are right and others wrong, it is necessary to discover why a person acts in a wrong way instead of a right way. If we are to praise or blame, praise virtue and blame vice, a person must be truly capable of making a choice. Aristotle assumed that an act for which a person could be held responsible must be a voluntary act. A genuine choice is a voluntary action. But not all our actions are voluntary. Thus, Aristotle said that "praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while for the involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is excited." The distinction, as he saw it, between voluntary and involuntary acts was in general this: Involuntary acts are those for which a person is not responsible because they are (1) done out of ignorance of particular circumstances, (2) done as a result of external compulsion, or (3) done to avoid a greater evil. Voluntary acts are those for which a person is responsible because none of these three extenuating circumstances obtain.

The Virtues

In a general way we have already defined virtue as the fulfillment of humanity’s distinctive function and as the mean between extremes. Another way to describe Aristotle’s concept of virtue is to consider each virtue as the product of the rational control of the passions. In this way we can combine all aspects of human behavior. Human nature consists for Aristotle not simply in rationally but in the full range covered by the vegetative, sensitive or appetitive, and the rational soul. Virtue does not imply the negation or rejection of any of these natural capacities. The moral person employs all of his or her capacities, physical, and mental. Corresponding to these two broad divisions in humanity there are two functions of reason, the intellectual and the moral, and each has its own virtues. There are accordingly intellectual virtues and moral virtues.

The intellectual virtues are philosophical wisdom and understanding and owe their birth and development to teaching and learning. Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence comes the name ethics (ethike), "formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit)." All the moral virtues have to be learned and practiced, and they becomes virtues only through action, for "we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. " The "cardinal" moral virtues are also the virtues of magnificence, liberality, friendship, and self-respect. And although he acknowledged the central role of reason as a guide to practical and moral action, he nevertheless concluded that philosophical wisdom is superior to practical wisdom, that contemplation is most likely to lead to happiness.

 

Aristotle’s Ethics: The Virtues and Vices

From: Aristotle in Outline by Timothy A. Robinson

While it is helpful to see Aristotle’s list of virtues and vices laid out schematically, some of these are complicated enough that the abbreviated descriptions that fit on a chart are misleading. Consequently, I begin with narrative descriptions of each virtue, and the chart follows these.

Narrative Descriptions

Courage – is moderation in the tendencies to feel fear and boldness or confidence. Excess in the propensity to fear combined with deficiency in the propensity to be confident constitutes cowardice. Deficiency of fear and excess of confidence produce rashness or foolhardiness.

Temperance – is moderation in the desire for physical pleasures. An excess of desire is overindulgence. Deficiency has no common name, but may be labeled "insensitivity."

Generosity or Liberality – is moderation in the size of the gifts one is prone to give or accept. The tendency to give in excess and accept too little is spend thriftiness or prodigality. The tendency to accept too much and give too little is stinginess.

Magnificence or Munificence – has the same nature as generosity but applies to large public expenditures.

Pride or High-Mindedness – is moderation in one’s desire for or tendency to demand great honors. The mean here is defined by what one deserves. Desiring more than one deserves is vanity. Desiring less than one deserves is excessive humility.

Ambition – is similar to pride but pertains to smaller honors. There was no name for this virtue in Greek, and in English we use the same word both for the virtue and for the vice of excess (maybe we have trouble distinguishing them). The deficiency we just call "lack of ambition."

Good temper – is moderation in one’s proneness to anger. The vice of excess is irascibility or irritableness, of deficiency is spiritlessness or passivity (there’s not a good word for it).

Truthfulness – is what Aristotle called moderation in one’s presentation of oneself, with boastfulness as the excess and self-deprecation as the deficiency.

Wittiness – is moderation in the desire to amuse others. Excess desire is buffoonery, and deficient desire is boorishness.

Friendliness – is moderation in the desire to please others generally. The excess is obsequiousness, and the deficiency is quarrelsomeness.

Modesty or a Sense of Shame – is moderation in one’s susceptibility to shame or embarrassment. Shyness or bashfulness is the excess, and the deficiency is shamelessness.

Righteous Indignation (nemesis) – is moderation in one’s tendency to feel pain at the good fortune of others or pleasure at their bad fortune. Moderation consists in feeling pain at good fortune which is contrary to desert (when bad people do well), and pleasure when the good fortune is deserved. It also means feeling pain at undeserved bad fortune and pleasure when people get their comeuppance. To feel pain at all good fortune, whether deserved or not, is envy. To feel pleasure at the bad fortune of others, regardless of desert, is malice.

Justice - consists in a propensity to give or return to a person the right amount (what is due to them), whereas injustice allots them either more or less than what is due. We might label the vices "favoritism" and "discrimination."  

Contemplation

Aristotle concludes that if happiness is the product of our acting according to our distinctive nature, it is reasonable to assume that it is acting according to our highest nature, and "that this activity is contemplative we have said." This activity is the best, says Aristotle, "since not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best knowable objects." Moreover, contemplation "is most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything." Finally, "we think happiness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities."